(A) Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S.482 - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (46 of 2023), S.528 - Quashing of proceedings - Refusal - Domestic violence proceedings initiated by wife and daughter under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Husband relied on settlement waiving wife's future claims, while wife pleaded that settlement was signed under duress - Wife had expressly and voluntarily relinquished her monetary and maintenance claims and had not taken any legal steps to set aside Settlement Agreement or divorce decree - Since domestic violence allegations related to acts that occurred before the settlement and no fresh cause of action after divorce was shown, proceedings against husband were held to be an abuse of process - However, daughter was not a party to Settlement Agreement and therefore had not waived her right to seek monetary relief - Order refusing quashing was set aside and proceedings against husband were quashed, while daughter had given liberty to initiate fresh proceedings for monetary relief in accordance with law. (Para 8,10,11,12,14,15)

(A) Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951), S.86, S.81(3) - Conduct of Election Rules (1961), R.94A - Election petition - Rejection - On ground of supply of copy of election petition without notarization or proper attestation - S.81(3) provides that copy of every Election Petition to be attested by Election Petitioner under his own signature - Admittedly, there was difference in attestation in Election Petition - However, signature of election petitioner on foot of page, certifying it as true copy would suffice as clear declaration - Rejection of election petition by High Court was erroneous and set aside. (Para 8, 26)

(B) Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951), S.86, S.83 proviso - Conduct of Election Rules (1961), R.94A - Election petition - Dismissal of - Ground that affidavit in respect of corrupt practices, accompanying Election Petition was not in prescribed form in terms of S.83 proviso - As per R.94A, affirmation on oath is required on Form-25 i.e. copies supplied to Returned Candidate - It is trite of law if Form-25 read with Rule 94A is not in conformity with requirement, then those parts of petition which contain allegations of corrupt practices alone are required to be struck off and other independent grounds, if any, are required to be tried and decided on merits - Admittedly, Form-25 was affirmed before Commissioner of Affidavits as available in original before Court - Obviously, defect under S.83 does not entail peremptory dismissal under S.86 - High Court was thus requested to verify and if due attestation of affirmation on oath, is available, proceed with matter on merits and if not available, not to permit allegation of corrupt practices to be urged and proceed with consideration on merits of other grounds, if any are pleaded - Rejection of election petition by High Court was erroneous and set aside. (Para 21, 26)

(A) Advocates Act (25 of 1961), S. 35 - Professional misconduct - Allegation against Advocate that he had by way of interview released confidential details of complainant, his client which was broadcast on television channels - Justification offered by Advocate that he had by then was no longer her counsel, that he was being pursued by media, and he spoke only to answer accusations made against him - Said justification did not suffice - Duty of advocate is not conditional upon client's continued good behaviour towards advocate - Advocate cannot use information received in confidence against his client, and fact that she had since become his adversary makes no difference - Advocate who considers himself falsely accused may place his version before investigating agency or he may sue in defamation - He cannot take his grievance to television channel and there disclose privileged communications, play recorded conversations with his former client, and describe her complaint as false case of rape while accusing her of seeking publicity - Allegations of professional misconduct thus proved and sufficient to sustain punishment. (Para 17, 18, 19)

(B) Advocates Act (25 of 1961), S. 35 - Imposition of punishment - Prayer for enhancement - Allegations of professional misconduct against Advocate was proved and he was imposed with punishment of removal from roll of advocates for two years - Material on record, including exchanges complainant herself relied upon, showed that while engagement subsisted she and Advocate were in discussion about means by which police official might be trapped, which is not conduct of client simply seeking legal advice - Nor was her account of what followed complete - She appeared before electronic media of her own volition and spoke of her case, though her grievance before Court was that her case was made public - Complainant had not come before court with clean hands - Having been less than candid about each of matters, she cannot ask Court to enlarge relief granted to her - Prayer for enhancement of punishment was rejected. (Para 20)

(C) Advocates Act (25 of 1961), S. 35 - Constitution of India, Art. 14 - Professional misconduct - Disciplinary proceedings - Natural justice - Allegations of professional misconduct against Advocate - Plea that Advocate was denied reasonable opportunity of being heard by Disciplinary Committee - However, record showed that Advocate entered appearance and filed written statement refuting allegations - He was represented by counsel, and he participated in recording of evidence - He knew, from institution of disciplinary case, down to passing of order imposing punishment that proceedings were pending against him and what those proceedings alleged - Party who had been present throughout cannot be heard to say that he was absent, especially one who is himself Advocate - Ground was flimsy and found to be afterthought, rejected. (Para 14)

(D) Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), S. 35 - Imposition of costs - Court observed that each party had come to Court complaining of wrong, and each was author of good part of it - Between them they occupied time of Bar Council of India, High Court and Supreme Court for eleven years - That time belonged to other litigants, waiting for reliefs they genuinely need - Such conduct was disapproved - Both parties were directed to pay costs of Rs. 5,00,000/- to be deposited with Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks. (Para 21, 23)

(A) Constitution of India, Art.226 - Public interest litigation - Construction of Limited Use Subway in lieu of Level Crossing - Directions for expeditious completion - Project was pending for considerable period and authorities had initiated land acquisition, tender and approval processes - As per material on record, project had now progressed beyond stage of consideration and authorities had initiated steps towards its implementation - State authorities were directed to complete pending land acquisition, approvals, designs and estimates and make requisite land available without avoidable delay - Southern Railway was directed to finalise tender and, upon award of contract and availability of land, complete railway portion within six months. (Para 6, 9, 12, 13, 14)

(A) Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (33 of 1989), S. 3(1)(r), S. 3(1)(s) - Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S. 62 - Summoning order - Challenge against - Allegations that accused had used caste-based abuses against informant - Mere fact that occurrence took place within premises of a school did not, by itself, satisfy requirement of public view - FIR and site plan place occurrence inside an enclosed room, while statements of witnesses did not establish that they were present inside room or that they heard alleged caste-based utterances - Essential requirement of "public view" was not satisfied - Offences under Ss. 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of SC/ST Act were not prima facie made out against accused - Summoning order was quashed. (Para 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18)

(A) Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S.127 - Interim maintenance - Reduction in - Challenge against - Wife and two minor daughters challenged order reducing daughters' interim maintenance from Rs.30,000 to Rs.15,000 each p.m. - Maintenance was reduced merely because appellant-wife was earning - Responsibility of maintaining children is shared by both parents and cannot be divided by a simple arithmetic calculation - Appellant-wife was not only employed but was also bearing day-to-day responsibility of daughters' upbringing and education - Further, respondent-husband, a qualified doctor, admitted earning Rs.2,00,000/- p.m. - Rs.60,000/- p.m. for education, upbringing and maintenance of two school-going daughters was reasonable and not excessive - Family Court had properly considered parties' income, status and expenses of children, and its award did not warrant interference - Reduction order was set aside and original interim maintenance amount was restored. (Para 7,8,9,10,11,12,14)

(A) Constitution of India, Art.226 - General Provident Fund cum Pension Scheme - Claim for - Petitioner sought declaration that he was entitled to be covered under General Provident Fund cum-Pension Scheme and not under Central Pension Fund Scheme for services rendered by him on post of Professor at National Institute of Rural Development - However, as per Office Order, services of petitioner as Professor on contractual basis were regularised subject to condition that his services would be governed by existing CPF Scheme - Terms and conditions of regularisation were not challenged by petitioner at any point of time - Having accepted terms and conditions for regularisation of services and raising grievance post-retirement after accepting benefits under CPF Scheme, petitioner was rightly non-suited by High Court - Further, petitioner was similarly situated as S.S.P. Sharma's case where an employee was held entitled to benefits under CPF Scheme - Rejection of claim was proper. (Para 7)

(A) Prevention of Corruption Act (49 of 1988), S.7, S.12, S.13(1)(d) - Illegal gratification - Demand - Accused, Talati-cum-Mantri (A1) and Panchayat Peon (A2), allegedly demanded bribe of Rs.120 for issuing an Income Certificate - Alleged demand of Rs.120 by A1 - Testimony of complainant was inconsistent with his earlier statement, where he had stated that A1 initially demanded Rs.200 and later settled for Rs.120 - Further, although complainant was instructed by the ACB to hand over the entire Rs.120 upon demand, he gave only Rs.20 to A2, who neither demanded money nor questioned the reduced amount despite being close to A1 - These circumstances, along with discrepancies in evidence regarding how Rs.20 note was handed over, created substantial doubt about alleged demand - Held, prosecution failed to prove A1's demand for Rs.120 beyond reasonable doubt. (Para 10,11,12,13)

(B) Prevention of Corruption Act (49 of 1988), S.7, S.13(1)(d), S.20 - Penal Code (45 of 1860), S.120B - Illegal gratification - Criminal conspiracy - Accused, Talati-cum-Mantri (A1) and Panchayat Peon (A2), allegedly demanded and accepted bribe of Rs.120 for issuing an Income Certificate - Prosecution had failed to prove any criminal conspiracy between A1 and A2 under S.120B IPC, and their acquittal on that charge was upheld - Although A1 was alleged to have demanded the bribe and A2 received Rs.20, the demand against A2 was not proved and no bribe amount was recovered from A1 - Presumption under S.20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act arises only after prosecution proves initial demand beyond reasonable doubt - Since alleged demand itself was doubtful, mere recovery of Rs.20 from A2, even with anthracene powder, could not establish offence or justify drawing statutory presumption. (Para 14,15)

(C) Prevention of Corruption Act (49 of 1988), S.7, S.12, S.13(1)(d) - Evidence Act (1 of 1872), S.3 - Illegal gratification - Demand and acceptance - Proof - Accused Talati-cum-Mantri (A1) and Panchayat Peon (A2), allegedly demanded and accepted a bribe of Rs.120 for issuing an Income Certificate - Prosecution case was doubtful because Rs.20 was paid to A2 only after A1 had already prepared and handed over the Income Certificate, making it unsafe to presume that payment was pursuant to a bribe demand - Sanction for prosecuting A1 found invalid, as it was granted by the Deputy District Development Officer instead of the competent District Development Officer - Since prosecution failed to prove initial demand by A1 and no demand by A2, mere possession of Rs.20 by A2 was insufficient to establish offences or invoke statutory presumption - Conviction was set aside. (Para 16,17,18,19)

(A) Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S. 482, S. 156(3) - Quashing of FIR - Rejection of prayer - Prior to registration of FIR, application for investigation was rejected observing version set up by complainant was contrary to material contained in Police report - Thereafter petitioner filed writ petition seeking quashing of FIR and consequential proceedings - Provision of S. 156(3) of Cr.P.C. is intended to secure exercise of statutory power of investigation where Police fail or refuse to discharge their statutory duty - Order passed u/S. 156(3) of Cr.PC is not one rendered upon adjudication on merits of allegations against proposed accused but confined to regulating commencement of investigation in accordance with statutory scheme of Code - Rejection of application u/S. 156(3) of Cr.P.C. cannot curtail or extinguish independent statutory obligation cast upon Police u/S. 154 of Cr.P.C. - Accused was arraigned in five FIR's with substantially similar allegations - Those allegations, if accepted at their face value, unquestionably disclosed commission of cognizable offences warranting investigation - Rejection application for quashing of FIR was proper. (Para 34, 39, 43, 47, 48)

(A) Motor Vehicles Act (59 of 1988), S.166 - Compensation - Contributory negligence - Rash and negligent driving of heavy passenger bus resulted in accident with car coming from opposite direction - FIR and charge sheet, though not conclusive, was relevant for determining negligence in claim proceedings - Criminal acquittal of driver of offending vehicle being on benefit of doubt could not be treated as honourable acquittal and does not affect the assessment of tortious liability - Non-examination of claimant in criminal trial was not fatal, as she was not summoned as witness - Standard of proof in criminal proceedings and proceedings before Tribunal is distinct - High Court erred in relying upon topographical sketch and drag marks while ignoring point of contact and material admissions to record finding of contributory negligence - Finding of Tribunal holding driver of offending bus solely negligent, was restored. (Para 22.1)

(B) Motor Vehicles Act (59 of 1988), S.166 - Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), O.41, R.27 - Compensation - Production of additional evidence - Delay in filing additional evidence regarding deceased's bank account, professional income and business transactions was due to acute physical and mental shock of accident to claimant, her subsequent job loss, and systemic delays in retrieving dormant bank records - Litigation had been pending for 21 years - Proceedings before MACT are summary in nature and - To avoid extending litigation, additional evidence was permitted. (Para 25)

(C) Motor Vehicles Act (59 of 1988), S.168 - Compensation - Assessment - Deceased, 30 year old Software Engineer/IT entrepreneur - Income was assessed; after statutory deductions, future prospects - One-third deduction was made towards personal expenses - Multiplier of 17 was applied - Compensation was enhanced. (Para 27, 28)

Insurance Act (4 of 1938), S.64VB - Marine Cargo Annual Turnover Policy - Scope of authority of agent - Insured initially obtained coverage up to Rs. 1200 Crores, with premium adjustable according to actual turnover - On its turnover exceeding insured limit, Divisional Manager of Insurance Company, by email D/-17.5.2010 assured that coverage would continue despite such excess turnover - Fire occurred on 7.11.2010 before any additional premium was paid - Insured having thereafter paid additional premium and endorsement enhancing coverage was issued with effect from 17.12.2010 - Held, Divisional Manager had no authority to enlarge turnover-based risk or dispense with statutory requirement under S.64VB and his email could not create additional or unlimited cover beyond policy terms - Subsequent endorsement being prospective, could not cover loss which had already occurred - Insurer was not bound by act of agent beyond his authority.

(A) Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S. 401, S. 386 - Sentence - Enhancement of - Revisional jurisdiction of High court - Appellant, convict preferred appeal which was decided along with reference made by Session Court for affirming death sentence - High Court while clubbing both proceedings, exercised its suo moto revisional jurisdiction to evaluate entirety of trial proceedings and even though no appeal for enhancement had been preferred by State or Complainant, High Court went on to enhance sentence of appellant which is impermissible and illegal - Order of High Court enhancing sentence was set aside. (Para 18, 19)

(B) Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S. 401, S. 31(1) - Revisional jurisdiction - Sentence - Direction to run consecutively - Legality - Sentence of life imprisonment cannot be directed to run consecutively, either with another life sentence or with fixed term sentence - Trial Court and High Court awarded appellant sentence of life imprisonment u/Ss. 449, 302, 364 of IPC and fixed-term sentences u/Ss. 392 and 201 of IPC, which were directed to run consecutively, which goes against settled position of law that, in cases where convict is awarded multiple sentences for multiple offences and one of sentences awarded is life imprisonment, sentences must only run concurrently and not consecutively - Accordingly, court modified directions and held that sentences of appellant shall run concurrently. (Para 21, 22)

(A) Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S. 354(5) - Constitution of India, Art. 21, Art. 14, Art. 19 - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (46 of 2023), S. 393(5) - Contents of judgment - Hanging as a sole method of execution - Constitutional validity - Constitutional validity of S. 354(5) of Cr.P.C. insofar as it prescribes hanging as only mode of execution of death sentence was already examined and settled by a three-Judges Bench of Supreme Court in AIR 1983 SC 1155 - Scope of interference by a Bench of two-Judges on very same issue is extremely limited - Neither petitioner nor impleader had placed on record any material capable of casting doubt upon view so expressed by three-Judges Bench - Decision of three-Judges Bench in AIR 1983 SC 1155 cannot be referred to a larger Bench for reconsideration of constitutional validity of S. 354(5) of Cr.P.C./S. 393(5) of BNSS.

(A) Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S.432(5) - Prisons Act (9 of 1894), S.59(28) - T. N. Suspension of Sentence Rules (1982), R.35 - Parole - Grant of leave of 21 days - Murder case - Convict was incarcerated for 3 years, 7 months and 17 days and hence his eligibility for leave was not in question - He had not availed any leave thus far, either ordinary or emergency - Report of Probation Officer found reason to seek leave genuine and also recommended grant of leave, though with some condition - Convict prisoner was granted 21 days ordinary leave, though with escort. (Para 4, 5, 6)

(A) Registration Act (16 of 1908), S.17(1A) - Transfer of Property Act (4 of 1882), S.111(e), (f) - Landlord and tenant relationship - Agreement to sell executed by landlord in favour of tenant - Effect on subsisting tenancy - Mere execution of agreement to sell between a landlord and tenant does not ipso facto bring about a determination of subsisting tenancy - Agreement to sell neither contained stipulation indicating that possession of defendant thereafter would be referable to agreement to sell, nor it provided for cessation of obligation to pay rent or otherwise evince an intention to alter subsisting landlord-tenant relationship - Continuous possession of tenant even after execution of agreement to sell does not amount to part performance under S.53A of TP Act unless such possession is shown to be directly relatable to and flowing from agreement to sell - Agreement to sell, not being a registered deed of conveyance, does not by itself confer any title or interest in property - Clause of agreement providing that on failure to obtain loan agreement would stand cancelled and purchaser would hand over possession back as it was in previous condition, in fact, indicated continuance of existing tenancy - Further, conduct of defendant of not choosing to institute a suit for specific performance militated against the plea that jural relationship between parties had transformed from that of landlord-tenant to vendor-vendee upon execution of agreement - Direction issued for vacation of premises in favour of plaintiff, was proper. (Para 14, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27)

(A) Evidence Act (1 of 1872), S. 3 - Penal Code (45 of 1860), S. 302 - Murder - Testimony of sole eye-witness - Reliability - Accused persons, presuming victim was a Witch, dragged her from her house, took her near their house and assaulted her to death with a lathi - Prosecution case based on direct ocular evidence of the daughter of the victim - Reliable testimony of a sole eye-witness sufficient to sustain conviction - Sole eye-witness deposed to having witnessed the entire incident, detailing the manner of assault and weapons used - Witness remained unshaken throughout examination-in-chief and cross-examination regarding the direct role of the accused in inflicting the fatal brutality - Presence of the sole witness at the scene was entirely natural - Close familial relationship between victim and witness did not automatically render her an interested or unreliable witness - Direct ocular evidence, when natural, cogent and trustworthy, takes precedence over other forms of evidence - Testimony of the sole witness fully corroborated by medical evidence - Guilt of accused established - Conviction held proper. (Para 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25)

(B) Evidence Act (1 of 1872), S. 3 - Penal Code (45 of 1860), S. 300, S. 304 Part I - Murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder - Sudden fight - Intention of accused - Prosecution established through compelling direct evidence that the accused, acting in concert with the co-accused, brutally murdered the victim on the allegation that she had caused the death of a young girl through witchcraft - On examining the medical and physical evidence, injuries inflicted on the victim, specifically grievous wounds to the head, neck, chest and other vital organs, manifested a clear intention to cause death - Nothing on record to bring the act of the accused within any of the statutory exceptions to S. 300 IPC - Conviction for murder could not be altered. (Para 28, 35, 36)

(C) Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S. 154 - FIR - Effect of delay in lodging - Murder case - Incident occurred in the evening on 17.02.1998 and matter was reported at Police Station the next day at about 11:00 a.m. - At the time of the incident, informant-daughter of victim was aged 15-16 years - It was but natural that after witnessing the brutal assault and murder of her mother, she would be under shock and despair - After her maternal uncle came to their house, she mustered the courage to go to the Police Station to lodge FIR - Delay in lodging the FIR was well-explained and not fatal to the prosecution case. (Para 30)

(A) Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S.190, S.482 - Cognizance of offence - Quashing of - Offences u/Ss.465,468,34 of Penal Code - Dispute regarding execution of gift deed in favour of daughter in law of one of accuse persons - Complainant had not suffered loss from act of execution of deed - Matter essentially involving civil dispute within family of accused persons - Order taking cognizance was set aside. (Para 5,6)

(A) Constitution of India, Art.226 - Salary - Claim for - Grievance of petitioners, employees regarding non-payment of salary for period of subsistence of their contract - Salary was admittedly paid to some of petitioners, employees - Remaining petitioners were directed to file their individual representations before the Director along with all supportive documents within six weeks. (Para 7,8)

(A) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (46 of 2023), S.483 - Bail - Grant of - FIR was registered u/Ss.5 (j) (ii) and 6 of POCSO Act - Accused and victim were in love relationship due to which victim got pregnant - Both had attained age of majority and got married - Marriage certificate was submitted on record - No useful purpose for accused to be incarcerated in custody - Bail was granted. (Para 9)

(A) Electricity Act (36 of 2003), S. 57 - Constitution of India, Art. 226 - Writ petition - Maintainability - Claim for compensation for death due to electrocution - Transmission of electricity being inherently dangerous activity, entity undertaking such activity is liable to compensate injured/deceased under principle of strict liability, subject to recognised exceptions - State enterprises are not exempt from such liability - High Court erred in holding that disputed questions of fact were immaterial on ground that principle of absolute liability applied and in applying multiplier method for determination of compensation - Just, reasonable and fair compensation has to be determined having regard to income of deceased and other relevant factors - Where disputed questions of fact arise, writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 ought not to be invoked for determination of compensation. (Para 14, 15, 16)

(A) Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act (51 of 1993), S.19 - Banking Regulation Act (10 of 1949), S.21A - Recovery of loan - Reduction in amount - Challenge against - DRAT had determined dues at Rs.54,90,413 with 9% interest - However High Court relied on earlier certificate of PNB showing dues of Rs.31.99 lakh and reduced liability after adjusting subsequent payments - Recall/modification application by PNB was dismissed - High Court wrongly treated Rs.31.99 lakh as total outstanding amount by ignoring interest maintained separately in PNB's suspense account after loan became an NPA - Interest component forms part of recoverable debt - Alternative calculations of Trust were found inconsistent and self-serving - Orders of High Court reducing liability of Trust and dismissing recall application by Bank were set aside and Trust was held liable to pay full amount Rs.54, 90,413 with 9% simple interest, after giving credit for subsequent payments. (Para 11,12,14,15)

(A) Partnership Act (9 of 1932), S. 69(2) - Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), O. 7, R. 2 - Suit for recovery of money - Dismissal of - Ground of non-registration of respondent/plaintiff firm - Memorandum issued by Registrar of Firms, acknowledging receipt of documents was an intimation that documents were filed/recorded/registered pursuant to Indian Partnership Act, 1932 - It also indicated Registration number allotted to respondent-firm, showing that firm was registered - Certified copy of Form-VIII of Registrar of Firms, duly certified by Registrar of Firms reiterated Registration number of plaintiff-firm and date of registration which was also in consonance with Memorandum - Order of Trial Court dismissing suit on ground that plaintiff was not a partnership firm was not proper. (Para 4, 5, 6)

(B) Limitation Act (36 of 1963), S. 3 - Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), O. 7, R. 2 - Suit for recovery of money- Bar of limitation - Suit was filed with cause of action arising on 03.06.2008; when a demand was raised by respondent/plaintiff firm, on 01.08.2008; when it was responded and on 02.09.2008; when part payment was made - Communication addressed by appellant/defendant in response to demand raised by respondent indicated that there was no acknowledgment of debt and payment made was not a part payment but payment with respect to three invoices, admitted as remaining due, by appellant - To surpass limitation to file suit for recovery of money as covered by bills dated 30.01.2006, it should have been filed before 29.01.2009 - As for other bills, last of them was dated 06.03.2007, which remained unpaid and suit was filed on 05.06.2010 after limitation expired - Order of High Court in First Appeal to extent of granting relief of recovery was set aside - Suit being barred by limitation was dismissed. (Para 15, 16, 17, 18)

(A) Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), O. 39, R. 1 - Interim injunction - Subject matter of suit was shareholding, Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) interests and immovable properties - If defendant were left free pending trial, to alienate or encumber or otherwise deal with family companies, LLPs or properties acquired with their proceeds, decree in plaintiff's favour whether resting on Will or on finding of undue influence avoiding transfers, or otherwise would be rendered empty formality - Risk was squarely present and it was loss of control over family entities, or creation of third-party rights in properties acquired through them, that no eventual decree could undo. (Para 23)

(B) Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), O. 39, R. 1, O. 39, R. 2 - Temporary injunction - Prima facie case - Nature of original plaintiff's interest under Will and whether it matured into absolute interest u/S. 14 of Hindu Succession Act, was itself substantial question - So too was effect of subsequently propounded Will, in respect of which probate proceedings remained pending - Plea that defendants, while residing with elderly widow dependent upon them, procured transfer of virtually entire family shareholding and estate in their own favour, was not frivolous or vexatious plea - It self-evidently required proof at trial and cannot be shut out at threshold - Observation of Single Judge that prima facie case was in favour of plaintiff was proper - Insistence of Division Bench on clear prima facie nexus, on detailed reading of specific clauses of Will, on effect of original plaintiff's conduct in separate suit, and on applicability of S. 89 of Companies Act, 2013, required precisely kind of close, merit based enquiry that authorities hold to be impermissible at interlocutory stage. (Para 27)

(C) Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), O. 39, R. 1, O. 39, R. 2 - Temporary injunction - Balance of convenience - By granting temporary injunction, court had not restrained any business or enterprise conducted by defendants in their own right, but further alienation of shareholding, LLP interests and immovable properties whose very provenance was under cloud - Defendants lose nothing of substance by being restrained from alienating assets to which their title was itself under challenge - Plaintiffs on other hand, stand to lose, irrecoverably, very subject-matter of suit, comprising control of family companies representing substantial part of testator's estate, should that control or properties acquired through it pass into hands of strangers to suit during its pendency - Balance of convenience was in favour of plaintiffs - Grant of temporary injunction was proper. (Para 30)

(D) Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), O. 39, R. 1, O. 39, R. 2 - Temporary injunction - Irreparable injury - Plea of defendants that certain properties held by them were self-acquired properties - Case of plaintiffs that those properties were purchased with proceeds of loans and advances drawn from family companies and LLPs and with sale proceeds of properties transferred by original plaintiff, without any independent source of income being pleaded by defendants for their acquisition was accepted prima facie by Court - Whether they were in truth self-acquired, and whether plea of traceability was ultimately made out, were matters for trial and not for Division Bench, to resolve at interlocutory stage - Injury that, if shareholding and properties were permitted to be alienated, would be irreparable in relevant sense, existed, was correctly found by Single Judge. (Para 34)

(E) Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), O. 39, R. 1, O. 39, R. 2, O. 43, R. 1(r) - Temporary injunction - Appellate court's interference - Permissibility - Discussed.

(F) Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), O. 43, R. 1(r), O.39 R.1 - Appellate court's interference - In orders granting injunction - Scope - It does not extend to an examination of the final effect, probative value or ultimate merits of the documents annexed to the pleadings.

(A) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (46 of 2023), S.528 - Quashing of FIR - Refusal - FIR was filed against five officers/employees of M/s Oriental Aromatics Ltd. for offence of cheating under S.318(4) - Complainant alleged that he paid Rs. 73,00,000/- as advance for distributorship of Saraswati camphor, against which goods worth Rs.31,49,167/- were supplied, while balance was allegedly not returned - FIR did not disclose essential ingredient of cheating-dishonest or fraudulent intention at inception of transaction - Since distributorship was granted, agreement was executed, and goods were actually supplied, allegations did not establish initial fraudulent intention - Contractual breach or termination, without such intention from beginning, is essentially a civil dispute and does not automatically constitute cheating - Complainant's earlier legal notices did not mention alleged Rs. 73,00,000/- advance or Rs. 41,50,833/- liability, which was raised for first time in FIR - Criminal proceedings were liable to be quashed - Order of High Court refusing to quash the FIR and proceedings was set aside. (Para 13,14,15,16,17)

(B) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (46 of 2023), S.528 - Quashing of FIR - Refusal - FIR was filed against five officers/employees of M/s Oriental Aromatics Ltd. for offence of criminal breach of trust under S.316(2) of the BNS - Complainant alleged that he paid Rs.73 lakh as advance for distributorship of Saraswati camphor, against which goods worth Rs.31.49 lakh were supplied, while balance was allegedly not returned - Offence of criminal breach of trust under S.316(2) BNS was not made out because there was no allegation of entrustment - Money paid to a supplier as advance or consideration for goods becomes supplier's own money; failure to supply goods or return amount may constitute a breach of contract, but not criminal breach of trust in absence of entrustment - Cheating and criminal breach of trust are based on distinct and opposite legal ingredients and cannot ordinarily be alleged on same indivisible facts - Since FIR disclosed neither dishonest intention at inception nor entrustment, allegations amounted essentially to a commercial contractual dispute - Permitting criminal proceedings to continue would therefore amount to an abuse of process of law - Order of High Court refusing to quash the FIR and proceedings was set aside. (Para 18,19,22,23,24)

(A) Constitution of India, Art. 226 - Custodial death - Compensation - Accused was died during custody for offence punishable under S. 34(2) of Chhattisgarh Excise Act - Considering age of injuries noted in post-mortem report, possibility of deceased having sustained these multiple injuries spread over period of his custody cannot be ruled out - Facts had warranted registration of an FIR and a thorough investigation into circumstances leading to death of accused, which, State authorities conveniently and deliberately tried to cover up - Post-mortem report was not placed before High Court - Relevant material was brought on record only pursuant to directions issued by Supreme Court further highlights dilatory approach adopted by State authorities - To meet ends of justice, investigation into circumstances leading to custodial death of accused was entrusted to CBI - All officials found responsible for custodial violence, be proceeded in accordance with law - Conduct of State officials in failing to take appropriate steps pursuant to submission of judicial inquiry report shall also be examined - As an interim measure, compensation of Rs.25,00,000/- was directed to be paid to legal heirs of deceased. (Para 17, 18, 19, 21, 22)

(A) Customs Tariff Act (51 of 1975), Sch.I, S. XVIII, Chapt. 90 - Imported laser imagers - Classification of - Appellant imported 'Dryview 6850 Laser Imagers W/3D' from China and classified them under CTH 9018 90 19 in Sch.I, S. XVIII, Chapt. 90 - Imported laser imager was printer that uses photo thermographic (dry laser) technology to develop images on film, but it was not medical equipment, in itself, as it does not possess independent diagnostic skills or capabilities - According to appellant, laser imager was not 'part' or 'accessory' but 'apparatus' used for diagnostic purposes - Admittedly, laser imager had no diagnostic skill or capability of its own and must necessarily receive inputs from diagnostic equipment to carry out its function of printing films, it cannot per se be classified under this heading - As laser imagers did not directly fall under CTH 9018 90 19 or any other heading in CTH 9018, only avenue for CTH 9018 to be applied to them, as parts or accessories, would be by way of 'Notes' in Chapter 90 - Accessories suitable for use with number of machines, instruments or apparatus falling under same tariff heading would have to be classified with such machines, instruments or apparatus - When such accessories are suitable for use not only with machines, instruments or apparatus under a particular tariff heading but also with machines, instruments or apparatus falling under another tariff heading, they would necessarily have to be brought under residuary CTH 9033 00 00, being accessories suitable for use with machines, appliances, instruments or apparatus falling under Chapter 90, which have not been specified or included under particular tariff heading. (Para 8, 11, 18)

(A) Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), O.18, R.4 - Closure of evidence - Challenge against - Only one witness was to be examined by defendant - Thus, one more opportunity to lead evidence was required to be given to defendant so that matter could be decided on merits and not on basis of default committed by parties - Order of closure of evidence was set aside. (Para 11, 12)

(A) Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act (34 of 2007), S.3 (1) - Detention - Challenge against - On ground that there was delay in passing detention order - District Collector considered altogether nine cases for arriving at conclusion that
it was necessary to pass an order detaining detenue in preventive detention by classifying him as 'known rowdy'- Delay of 37 days from release of detenue on bail till passing of order of detention was explained as time taken for collection, verification and consideration of records - Delay cannot be considered as unreasonable and inordinate one, snapping live link between last prejudicial activity and order of detention - Detention was proper. (Para 9, 10)

Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Rules, 1963, R.3 - Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act (11 of 1962), S. 3, S. 10 - Parole - Rejection of application - Validity - Case of petitioner for release of parole was declined on ground that petitioner can breach peace of society if he was released on parole - However, police failed to justify conclusion drawn by Deputy Commissioner, as on what basis it can be considered that petitioner can breach peace of society - No satisfaction was recorded by Deputy Commissioner, as to justify his conclusion noted - Apprehension expressed by authorities was without any basis and result of surmises and conjectures - Rejection of parole was not well founded - Superintendent was directed to again consider parole application of petitioner. (Para 7, 11)

(A) Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S. 482 - Quashing of proceedings - Defamation - Acts done in discharge of official duties and in good faith - Allegations that accused public servants had defamed complainants by lodging FIR and conducting inquiry regarding alleged embezzlement of scholarship funds - Expression in good faith of opinion respecting conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent in a case decided by Court did not constitute defamation - Complaint by private persons against the petitioners/accused in respect of such official acts instead of Public Prosecutor was not maintainable in view of S. 199(2) of Cr.P.C. - Subsequent acquittal of complainants by Appellate Court on ground that inquiry was not conducted in accordance with law would not render such official acts defamatory - Proceedings liable to be quashed. (Para 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33)