(A) Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894), S.28A - Re-determination of compensation - Application for - Maintainability - Entertaining earlier application filed under S.28A on basis of award of Reference Court followed by receipt of money, shall not act as bar for same applicant to seek further re-determination of compensation on basis of award passed by High Court or Supreme Court - Even second application made under S.28A after award passed by High Court was maintainable. (Para 25)

(B) Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894), S.28A - Re-determination of compensation - Rejection of - On ground that landowners had already accepted earlier compensation enhanced by Reference Court - Landowners had earlier sought re-determination of compensation on basis of award of Reference Court and now sought further re-determination on parity with similarly placed landowners, in whose favor High Court was pleased to pass enhanced award - There was no bar for landowners to sought re-determination of compensation on basis of award of High Court, even if they had previously filed application after award of Reference Court - Fact that landowners had received compensation, pursuant to order passed on earlier occasion, was irrelevant - Order of rejection to re-determine compensation was set aside - Direction issued to respondents to re-determine compensation in favour of landowners in light of judgment of High Court. (Para 27, 28)

(A) Arbitration Act (10 of 1940), S. 30, S. 2(a), S. 4 - Arbitral award - Setting aside of - There was no written agreement between parties to submit differences to arbitration as required by S.2(a) of Act of 1940 - Cl.20 prescribed a measure that parties would maintain pending resolution, but that by itself cannot be an arbitration clause - State Govt. had no authority under S.143A(3) of Maharashtra Act of 1965 to appoint an arbitrator for agent and Municipal Council - Exercise of such power by Govt. cannot be equated to S.4 of Act of 1940, or there was no such agreement - Requirement of consensus ad idem for creation of arbitration agreement as contemplated under S.2(a) was absent - Since Arbitrator lacked inherent jurisdiction due to absence of arbitration agreement, entire proceedings were a nullity (coram non judice) and resulting award was non-est - There was no estoppel against Municipal Council for reason that it had initially participated in arbitral proceedings - This was for reason that they were forced into arbitration without consent and contract - Also, they challenged award on jurisdictional grounds before Civil Court and High Court - Arbitral proceedings were perfunctory and started and concluded in a short period - Order of High Court setting aside arbitral award was proper. (Para 26, 27)

(A) Pension Regulations for the Army (1961), Para 9, Para 125 - Pension Regulations for the Army Part II (2008), Para 18, Para 44, Para 47, Para 175 - Army Act (46 of 1950), S. 192 - Pension - Qualifying service - Personnel serving in Defence Security Corps (DSC) - Union of India through Ministry of Defence shall determine length of qualifying services in accordance with Paras 9 and 18 of Pension Regulations of 1961 and 2008 respectively, as well as Note 5 appended to letter dated 30.10.1987 - If, upon determination of length of qualifying service, there remains a shortfall of one year or less, DSC personnel shall be entitled to seek condonation of such deficiency for purpose of pension eligibility, in accordance with Para 125 of Pension Regulations of 1961 or Para 44 of Pension Regulations of 2008.

(B) Pension Regulations for the Army (1961), Para 125 - Pension Regulations for the Army Part II (2008), Para 44 - Army Act (46 of 1950), S. 192 - Pension - Qualifying service - Personnel serving in Defence Security Corps (DSC) - Once Pension Regulations specifically provide for condonation of shortfall in minimum DSC service, it is not open to Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (MoD/DESW), to stipulate an exception by way of executive letters - While Government may issue beneficial circulars/letters or clarifications where ambiguity exists, it cannot, by administrative fiat, amend or override clear and categorical provisions of Regulations. (Para 42)

(C) Pension Regulations for the Army Part II (2008), Para 6, Para 174(1)(b) - Army Act (46 of 1950), S. 192 - Pension - Qualifying service - Personnel serving in Defence Security Corps (DSC) - Conjoint reading of Para 6 with Para 174(1)(b) of Pension Regulations of 2008, reveals no bar on DSC personnel earning a second service pension - Such entitlement does not arise from same service, post, or continuous spell of employment, but from a distinct and independent engagement - Consequently, second spell of service in DSC is separate and distinct from first spell in Regular Army - Condonation of shortfall in DSC service is therefore entirely consistent with scheme of Army Regulations and does not create any inconsistency - Plea that provision for condonation of shortfall was intended only to ensure grant of a single defence pension was contrary to express language of Regulations. (Para 44, 45, 46)

(A) Contract Act (9 of 1872), S.28 - Arbitration and Conciliation Act (26 of 1996), S.34 - Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), S.5 - Arbitral award - Setting aside of - On ground of lack of jurisdiction - Agreement between parties for manning of vessels - Penalty sought towards damaged vessel - Manning agent disputing liability - Contractual clause restricting dispute resolution - Clause 3.20 of agreement limiting challenges to loss quantification while Clause 3.22 was arbitration clause which was widely worded- When clause 3.20 speaks of administration's decision being final it can only be in those cases where the wilful action or negligence is not disputed - Principles of the Rule of Law are fundamental to contract interpretation, especially where the State is a party - Although Clause 3.20 sought to make the administration's decision final and exclude courts and arbitration, such an interpretation would violate fairness, natural justice, and strike at very heart of the fundamental legal maxim " ubi jus ibi remedium " - Under that clause "finality" applies only to quantification when liability is admitted, not when it is disputed, as no party can be judge in its own cause - Since Clause 3.22 broadly covers all disputes, issues of liability fall within arbitration - Thus, the High Court erred in denying arbitrator's jurisdiction and setting aside arbitral award - Arbitral award was restored. (Para 28,29,30,31,34,40,41,44)

(A) Karnataka State Civil Services Act (14 of 1990), S. 3(1), S. 8 - Karnataka Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment by Competitive Examinations) Rules (1997), R. 4, R. 11 - Appointment - Posts of Gazetted Probationers in Group A and Group B Services - No provision in 1997 Rules under which candidate placed below a selected candidate acquires right to be appointed to a post left unfilled on account of non-completion of pre-appointment formalities or non-joining - In absence of such a provision, mere fact that selected candidate did not join cannot, by itself, create an enforceable right in favour of respondent candidate - Order of High Court holding that since selected candidate did not undergo mandatory medical examination, post continued to remain unfilled and, therefore, respondent, being candidate immediately next below, ought to have been considered against that post was erroneous.

(A) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (31 of 2016), S.31, S.3 (6) - Arbitration and Conciliation Act (26 of 1996), S.31(6) - Counterclaim in arbitral proceedings - After approval of resolution plan under IBC - Contract for supply, installation and commissioning of solar PV power plants between appellant and respondent - Arbitration proceedings initiated by the appellant - Appellant was admitted to CIRP but respondent did not raise any claim before Resolution Professional prior to approval of resolution plan - Although respondent raised counterclaim before Arbitral Tribunal well within time in course of proceedings - Resolution Professional was aware of counterclaim, yet, the same was not made part of resolution plan - Clause of resolution plan did not expressly, or even impliedly, exclude plea of set-off as defence in arbitration proceedings but it merely barred any claim for purpose of payment or settlement - An intention to exclude it would ordinarily be inferred by application of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius - As per S.31 of IBC, terms of resolution plan are to be read strictly, given the binding nature and extinguishment of claims not part of it which aligns with resolution objective of IBC - As resolution plan barred all future "payments/ settlements" in respect of claims which were not raised before it, non-inclusion of counterclaim in resolution plan resulted in its extinguishment - Respondent, although not entitled to independently pursue its claim by way of counterclaim post approval of resolution plan, ought to be permitted to raise plea of set-off at least by way of defence - Respondent may rely upon counter claim in defence, to extent necessary to prevent appellant from succeeding in arbitration proceedings either entirely or in part. (Para 11, 13, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27)

(A) Forest (Conservation) Act (69 of 1980), S. 2 - Constitution of India, Art. 21 - Land earmarked for execution of railway project under a Master Plan - Declaration as deemed forest - Permissibility by overriding statutory binding force - Land designated for a specific project under a legally approved Master Plan cannot be reclassified as a 'forest' of 'deemed forest' later, if it was not recorded as such when the plan started - Land was not a declared a "deemed" forest in revenue records at time when Master Plan took effect, hence its status was protected by statutory sanctity of that plan - Essentially, Govt. cannot use subsequent declarations of that land as 'forest' to override or block a development project that was already legally authorized by the Master Plan.

(B) Forest (Conservation) Act (69 of 1980), S. 2 - Constitution of India, Art. 21 - Determination of nature of land as 'deemed forest' - For execution of railway project under a Master Plan - Relevant date for consideration - Land designated for a specific project under a legally approved Master Plan cannot be reclassified as a 'forest' or 'deemed forest' later, if it was not recorded as such when the plan started - Relevant date for consideration and determination of nature of land as 'deemed forest' would be date of coming into force of Master Plan.

(C) Forest (Conservation) Act (69 of 1980), S. 2 - Determination of nature of land - As "forest" or "deemed forest" - Cannot be undertaken in isolation - Mere presence of vegetation or tree cover cannot by itself be equated with existence of a natural forest ecosystem - Native vegetation comprises plant species that have evolved within a particular geographical region and form part of its natural ecological system - Such species sustain biodiversity and ecological balance by supporting wildlife - Assertation as to nature of land, must necessarily take into account historical character of land, classification reflected in revenue and planning records and circumstances in which the land came to be utilized - Determination of nature of land must also necessarily take into account planning framework within which land is situated. (Para 32, 45, 49)

(A) Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S.204(1)(a), S.482 - Summoning order and proceedings - Quashing of - Summoning accused in a criminal case requires careful application of mind and cannot be done mechanically, and courts, while considering quashing, must examine overall circumstances beyond mere allegations - Appellant, a film director of Kahaani-2, was accused of copyright infringement by allegedly misusing complainant's script 'Sabak' - Complaint contained only vague and unsubstantiated allegations of copyright infringement without identifying any specific similarity between film and script - Statements of complainant and witnesses also failed to establish any such similarity, and a prior expert finding by Screen Writers Association had already concluded that no similarity existed, which was concealed from Magistrate - Further, script of appellant was created and registered prior to complainant's script, negating any possibility of copying - Summoning order was passed without application of mind and proceedings were frivolous and vexatious - Summoning order and entire criminal proceedings were quashed. (Para 13,14,15-20)

(A) Bihar Special Courts Act (5 of 2010), S.13, S.17 - Prevention of Corruption Act (49 of 1988), S.13 - Penal Code (45 of 1860), S.107 - Confiscation of property - Death of public servant during pendency of appeal - Effect on confiscation proceedings against spouse - Public servant was alleged to have amassed disproportionate assets apart from several immovable properties and other valuables - His death would not let wife 'off the hook' since she had been proceeded against for holding delinquent officer's, allegedly illegally begotten property right from time that authorities became alive to his alleged misdeeds - Non-public servant can be proceeded against when initial case is registered under S.13 of PC Act by virtue of S.107 of IPC - Wife had also been put to notice right at inception of proceedings along with delinquent officer - Only path available to High Court was to decide wife's appeal on merits - Setting aside order of confiscation was not proper - Appeal was restored to file of High Court to be decided on merits. (Para 10, 12, 13)

(A) Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S.482 - Penal Code (45 of 1860), S.420 - Quashing of proceedings - Absence of prima facie case - Offence of cheating - Accused had requested payment of money from complainant for movie project on promise of share in profits - Additional money was paid by complainant for its completion under promise of enhanced share in profits - Two post-dated cheques were issued by accused to complainant to return principal amount because of objection taken by complainant to release of movie - Said cheques were returned unpaid for insufficient funds in account - Since there was no denial about completion of movie and its ultimate release, promise to make movie was not false - There was no dishonest intention of accused in making promise which remained unfulfilled - Dishonour of cheque by itself was not sufficient to presume existence of dishonest intention on part of its drawer - In absence of allegations that movie made profits, complaint and supporting materials failed to indicate that accused harbored dishonest intention from inception - Proceedings against accused was quashed. (Para 16, 17, 18, 19, 20)

(A) Consumer Protection Act (68 of 1986), (Since Repealed), S. 2(1)(d)(ii) - Consumer - Definition - Purchase of goods for 'commercial purpose' - Dominant purpose of transaction must be examined to determine whether it was undertaken for profit generation.

(B) Consumer Protection Act (68 of 1986), (Since Repealed), S. 2(1)(d)(ii) - 'Commercial purpose' - Mere fact that a fixed deposit receipt earns interest does not by itself imply that the banking service availed is for a commercial purpose.

(C) Consumer Protection Act (68 of 1986), (Since Repealed), S. 2(1)(d)(ii) - Definition of 'consumer' - Services availed for 'commercial purpose' - Company deposited Rs. 9 crores by way of term deposit with Bank - Allegation that said term deposit was fraudulently hypothecated for availing overdraft without sanction of Company - Plea of Bank that banking services availed were for a commercial purpose and complainant was not a consumer - Transaction was between two business entities, Company and Bank, thus a business-to-business transaction - Bank set up case that FDR was pledged to avail credit facility and its maturity value was adjusted against dues - Company denied such loan transaction and alleged fraud, however, issue was not determined by any criminal court or civil court despite criminal complaint - Case was not merely of non-fulfilment of contractual obligation qua deposit but involved subsequent contract of pledge which, if proved, would override FDR - Held, without determination of alleged fraud or forged documents relating to pledge/loan, it was not possible to decide whether services availed were for commercial purpose. (Para 27)

(D) Consumer Protection Act (68 of 1986), (Since Repealed), S. 2(1)(c) , (Since Repealed), S. 12 - Consumer complaint - Maintainability - Complainant-Company had invested Rs. 9 crores by way of term deposit with Bank - Allegation that said deposit was fraudulently hypothecated for availing overdraft without sanction - On noticing overdraft against FDR, complaint was made to Bank - Bank pleaded that original FDR was in its possession and stood pledged for overdraft and further claimed that FDR with company was forged - Company reported matter to Economic Offences Wing - Dispute pertained to adjustment of maturity proceeds against outstanding overdraft - Bank acknowledged FDR and interest but refused release of proceeds on basis of subsequent pledge - Company alleged such pledge to be fraudulent and constituting offence - Held, issues relating to fraud and forged documents required adjudication in appropriate criminal or civil proceedings and could not be decided under the 1986 Act - Complaint was not maintainable. (Para 32)

(A) Motor Vehicles Act (59 of 1988), S. 168 - Compensation - Assessment of disability - MACT, upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence including disability certificate, neuro psychological assessment report, and nature of avocation of claimant as a Manager in a private concern, accepted permanent physical disability assessed by Medical Board at 63% - High Court, while observing that physical disability cannot be mechanically equated with functional disability, reduced functional disability suffered by claimant from 63% to 30% without adverting in detail to medical evidence on record, particularly findings of Medical Board and neuro psychological report evidencing cognitive deficits suffered by claimant as a consequence of injuries suffered in accident - No independent contra material was placed by insurer to displace evidentiary value of disability certificate - Such reduction of functional disability, in absence of convincing evidence impeaching credibility of medical certificates placed by claimant and without assigning cogent reasons, was unjustified - Order of High Court reducing functional disability suffered by claimant from 63% to 30% was not proper. (Para 20, 21)

(B) Motor Vehicles Act (59 of 1988), S. 168 - Compensation - Assessment of disability - Claimant was employed as Manager in a private concern, a role inherently dependent upon sustained cognitive functioning, including memory retention, analytical ability, executive decision-making, coordination and effective communication - Neuro psychological report on record evidences severe impairment in verbal and visual memory, frontal lobe dysfunction, and an IQ score of 65 placing him within the category of Mild Intellectual Disability - Medical Board had recorded that injuries resulted not only in cognitive impairment but also in partial blindness and orthopaedic limitations affecting mobility and stability - When these physical and neurological impairments were cumulatively evaluated, it became manifest that claimant's ability to effectively discharge his pre-accident duties stands substantially and irreversibly impaired - Having suffered such grave medical and neurological impairments, claimant would neither be considered suitable for managerial post nor would he be capable of effectively discharging onerous responsibilities attached to said post, particularly in light of his present condition, which was likely to deteriorate progressively over time - Disability for purpose of computation of compensation was to be reckoned at 100%. (Para 29, 30)

(C) Motor Vehicles Act (59 of 1988), S. 168 - Compensation - Re-determination of - Income of claimant assessed by Tribunal was proper -Disability for purpose of computation of compensation was to be reckoned at 100% - Multiplier of 17 was applied - Compensation was awarded under other heads of medical expenses, loss of amenities, pain and sufferings, transportation to hospital, extra nourishment, damage to clothing and articles and loss of marital prospectus - Claimant was entitled to enhanced compensation along with interest. (Para 31, 32)

(A) Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S. 319 - Summoning of additional accused - Application for - Case pertained to alleged killing of one person and people who apparently came together to make it happen - Complainant stated about deceased riding scooter and he himself was sitting as pillion and before reaching at place of incident, three known and one unknown persons came over there by two motorcycles, who fired shots at scooter rider - According to complainant, in list of witnesses, some persons who were necessary for establishment of case against accused persons were not listed which were thereafter summoned and examined - On basis of his own statement u/S. 161 of CrPC and testimony of witnesses summoned, complainant wished to have two additional persons summoned - Proposed additional accused had been named as persons involved in case by way of larger conspiracy or otherwise, by complainant and two witnesses - Inconsistencies in overall testimonies of those witnesses was matter of trial and not within Court's scope at time of considering application u/S. 319 of Cr.P.C. - Testimony, on oath, by 3 witnesses, including complainant was sufficient to meet strong and cogent evidence standard - Persons sought to be produced as additional accused were ordered to be produced as such and proceeded with, in accordance with law. (Para 11, 12)

(A) Insurance Act (4 of 1938), S. 2(6A) - Consumer Protection Act (35 of 2019), S. 58 - Fire insurance - Direction to pay compensation - Challenge against - Claimant attributing fire incident to short circuit - Record showed that claimant enhanced insurance coverage and procured additional policy in close proximity to incident, which raised serious doubt regarding bona fides of claim - Presence of kerosene, at seat of fire clearly indicated that it was introduced externally to initiate fire, thereby ruling out accidental cause and pointing toward deliberate arson for gain - Forensic examination of electrical infrastructure such as power supply wires, switchboards, and lighting systems, revealed no evidence of short circuit or electrical malfunction - Forensic report concluded that fire was result of deliberate human intervention, with strong likelihood of it being engineered for unlawful gain - Surveyor's report corroborated said conclusions - Both the forensic and Surveyor reports unequivocally established violation of policy conditions, warranting repudiation - Despite those categorical findings, NCDRC erroneously proceeded to allow claim in part merely on premise that fire incident had occurred - Fraud vitiates all solemn acts, and no person can be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong - Direction of NCDRC to pay compensation to claimant was set aside. (Para 13, 14, 15, 17)

(A) Constitution of India, Art. 226 - Appointment - Written examination - Correctness of answer to question - Examination for post of Law Officer in Municipal Corporation - - Question whether Option 'D' (None of the above) answered by respondent was correct or Option 'B' (Ninth Schedule) which according to recruiting body was correct - When Judges of High Court were at variance in their opinion as to correct answer to Question, it was least expected from mere law graduates, who were competing for said post, to reach to correct conclusion while answering multiple-choice question by process of interpretation of Constitutional provisions involving judgments of Supreme Court in several decades - From a law graduate's point of view, both answers may be correct - Both candidates deserved to be accommodated - Directions were issued to Municipal Corporation to accommodate both, appellant and respondent by creating a supernumerary post - Upon appointment of respondent, appellant, who was initially selected and joined and presently working on post, would be treated as senior. (Para 10, 11)

(A) Constitution of India, Art. 136 - Direction to pay compensation - As a consequence of orders in writ petition and writ appeal, respondent was held entitled to restoration of coal supply and receipt of compensation for suspended period from SECL - Therefore, petitioners' compliance vis-a-vis order would be to supply coal at current price for suspended period - However, orders of High court or Supreme court could not be understood as direction to Union of India/SECL to pay compensation towards difference in coal price which respondent paid during said period - On combined reading of those orders adjudicating dispute between parties, direction against Union of India and SECL was to supply coal for suspended period at current price and in accordance with prevalent policy - Union of India/SECL had suffered Orders in both rounds of litigation - Order of Supreme Court or High Court was complied with in letter and spirit - In line with commercial prudence, choice was given to respondent to select current price/prevalent policy of 09.04.2014 or 17.05.2019. (Para 13, 14, 15)

(A) Contract Act (9 of 1872), S. 126, S. 127, S. 128 - Guarantee - Liability of charterer - Plaintiff, a ship repair company, had carried out repairs to vessel and owner of vessel had instructed charterer to pay US $ 100,000 to plaintiff towards discharge of repair liability out of freight payable - Charterer issued a document styled as a "Corporate Guarantee" in favour of plaintiff undertaking to pay said amount upon arrival of vessel - Charterer by letter instructed its banker to remit said amount in account of plaintiff but bank erroneously remitted amount in account of owner of vessel - Plea of charterer that document styled as Corporate Guarantee was not a guarantee in law but merely an acknowledgment of a freight payment arrangement - Conjoint reading of said letter and Corporate Guarantee clearly established that undertaking was not merely a freight-sharing arrangement but constituted an independent guarantee satisfying requirements of Ss. 126 to 128 - Said documents constituted valid undertaking by charterer to discharge liability of vessel owner in event of default - Subsequent conduct of charterer, including request to Bank to remit said amount along with Form A2, reflected intention to honour guarantee - Admission in cross-examination by charterer that Corporate Guarantee was a conditional guarantee further supported said position - Plea of charterer was liable to be rejected - Charterer rightly held liable to remit said amount towards plaintiffs. (Para 23, 25)

(B) Contract Act (9 of 1872), S. 126, S. 127, S. 128 - Guarantee - Liability of charterer - Plaintiff, a ship repair company, had carried out repairs to vessel and owner of vessel had instructed charterer to pay US $ 100,000 to plaintiff towards discharge of repair liability out of freight payable - Charterer issued a document styled as a "Corporate Guarantee" in favour of plaintiff undertaking to pay said amount upon arrival of vessel - Charterer by letter instructed its banker to remit said amount in account of plaintiff but bank erroneously remitted amount in account of owner of vessel - Charterer pleaded that said letter was subject to Charter Party conditions and amendments and that under Cl. 30 freight was payable only to vessel owner and since Charter Party was never amended, no liability to pay plaintiff arose - Record revealed that charterer itself did not treat said condition as mandatory and on contrary, acted upon arrangement by processing necessary papers for approval from RBI and issuing specific instructions to Bank for remittance to plaintiff - A reading of letter in its entirety, coupled with subsequent communications and remittance instructions, clearly indicated that charterer had unequivocally undertaken to arrange payment to plaintiff out of freight payable - Having so acted upon said letter, charterer was estopped by its conduct by pleading that under Cl. 30, freight was payable only to vessel owner - Liability to pay was rightly fixed upon charterer. (Para 26, 26.1)

(C) Contract Act (9 of 1872), S. 129, S. 126 - Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), O.1, R. 10, O.8A, R.6A - Recovery suit - Third-party decree - Impleadment of party - Plaintiff, a ship repair company, carried out repairs to vessel - Vessel owner instructed charterer to pay US $100,000 to plaintiff towards repair charges out of freight payable - Charterer accordingly instructed bank to remit amount, but bank erroneously credited it to vessel owner's account - Charterer was given benefit of third party decree against bank while affirming liability of charterer to pay towards plaintiff - Plea that vessel owner was a necessary party and non-impleadment vitiated suit - Plaintiff, being dominus litis, entitled to determine parties and cause of action - Even if vessel owner had been impleaded as defendant, charterer could not have ordinarily maintained counterclaim against co-defendant, as counterclaim lay primarily against plaintiff - Exception existed under third-party procedure contemplated under O. 8A of CPC enabling defendant to claim contribution or indemnity from third party or co-defendant by issuing third-party notice - Charterer had failed to invoke said procedure and claimed contribution only from co-defendant Bank without issuing notice to vessel owner - Either of defendants, particularly Bank which committed mistake, could have taken recourse to such procedure - Having failed to avail available remedy, charterer could not shift burden upon plaintiff - Non-impleadment of vessel owner could not defeat plaintiff's claim - Liability to pay was rightly fixed upon charterer. (Para 27, 27.1, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32)

(D) Contract Act (9 of 1872), S. 129 - Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), O.8A, R.6A - Recovery suit - Third-party decree - Impleadment of party - Plaintiff, a ship repair company, carried out repairs to vessel later vessel owner instructed charterer to pay US $100,000 to plaintiff towards repair charges out of freight payable - Charterer accordingly instructed bank to remit amount, but bank erroneously credited it to vessel owner's account - Charterer was given benefit of third party decree against bank while affirming liability of charterer to pay towards plaintiff - Plea of charterer that payment could not be made to plaintiff without clearance of RBI - Said plea was not raised in pleadings - Record revealed that charterer itself, by letter, had communicated that necessary documents were being processed with RBI - Further, there existed a valid undertaking by way of guarantee executed by charterer and it could not absolve itself from liability arising therefrom - Interests of charterer was duly protected as its right to recover amount from vessel owner was preserved under S. 140 of Contract Act and third-party decree had also been granted in its favour and against Bank - Third party decree was rightly passed - Liability to pay was rightly fixed upon charterer. (Para 33)

(E) Contract Act (9 of 1872), S. 129 - Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), O.8A, R.6A - Recovery suit - Third-party decree - Impleadment of party - Plaintiff, a ship repair company, carried out repairs to vessel later vessel owner instructed charterer to pay US $100,000 to plaintiff towards repair charges out of freight payable - Charterer accordingly instructed bank to remit amount, but bank erroneously credited it to vessel owner's account - Charterer was given benefit of third party decree against bank while affirming liability of charterer to pay towards plaintiff - Plea of bank that it could not remit amount to plaintiff due to absence of approval from RBI- Bank failed to remit said amount to plaintiff despite clear instructions issued by charterer through letter and guarantee - No evidence of RBI approval or clarification sought by Bank - Bank, being bound to act as per mandate of its customer, could not have unilaterally transferred amount to vessel owner nor rely on Charter Party Agreement to justify such act - Even in absence of RBI approval, Bank ought to have withheld amount or sought clarification - Erroneous transfer admitted and failure to rectify despite request established liability - Third party decree was rightly passed in favour of charterer . (Para 35, 36)

(F) Contract Act (9 of 1872), S. 126 - Guarantee - To constitute a valid guarantee, the requirement is an undertaking or
promise to make a payment to creditor upon default of principal debtor for a benefit received by principal debtor. (Para 22)

(A) Motor Vehicles Act (59 of 1988), S.168 - Compensation - Entitlement - Deduction of benefits received under employer-provided Group Insurance Scheme - Permissibility - Deceased were employees whose dependents had received amounts under Employer's Group Insurance Schemes - Tribunal deducted such amounts from compensation awarded under Motor Vehicles Act - Amounts received under employer-provided group insurance or other contractual/social security benefits cannot be treated as "pecuniary advantages" liable to be deducted from compensation awarded under M.V. Act - Such benefits arise out of an independent contractual relationship and lack requisite nexus with statutory compensation payable for death in a motor vehicle accident - Principle of balancing loss and gain cannot therefore be invoked to diminish statutory entitlement of claimants to just compensation - High Court had rightly set aside deductions made by Tribunal - Claimants were entitled to full compensation. (Para 16, 17, 18)

(A) Kerala Public Services Act (19 of 1968), S. 2(1) - Special Rules for the Kerala Social Welfare Subordinate Service (2010), R. 3 - Appointment - Post of Anganwadi worker - Eligibility - Effect of amendment - Amendment increasing the quota of direct recruitment of Anganwadi Workers - Amendment only provided for ratio of 11% to graduates exclusively which did not disable them from applying for direct recruitment in 29% available to Anganwadi Workers with 10 years' experience who holds SSLC; which graduates already held - There can be no distinction found from amongst graduates and SSLC holders insofar as nature of duties performed - Intention of the Government as coming out from the counter affidavit and a plain reading of the amended rule does not bring forth any anomaly, but amended rule provides for 11% exclusive ratio for graduates, while enabling them to compete along with SSLC holders, without any weightage in 29% vacancies kept apart for direct recruitment from Anganwadi Workers with 10 years' experience.

(A) Evidence Act (1 of 1872), S.3 - Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (61 of 1985), S.20, S.50 - Possession of charas - Proof - Accused was allegedly found in possession of charas weighed 11 kg 50 grams - As per S.50, accused has to be apprised of his legal right to be searched either before Magistrate or Gazetted Officer - Act of Investigating Officer providing third option namely, search of accused in presence of Police officer was clearly contrary to provisions of S.50 - Oral testimony of witnesses also clearly established that Investigating Officer took departure from provisions of law and on contrary committed act which was clearly contrary to provisions of law - Testimony of witness further revealed that there was no electronic weighing scale available in shop and he was using only traditional weighing scale - Prosecution case that electronic weighing scale was used for weighing contraband article charas became doubtful and ultimately unacceptable - Prosecution failed to prove case against accused beyond reasonable doubt - Acquittal was proper. (Para 17, 18)

(A) Evidence Act (1 of 1872), S.3 - Penal Code (45 of 1860), S.376 - Rape - Circumstantial evidence - Allegation of rape against accused - Victim stated that she was sexually assaulted by accused at jungle while she was returning from evening church service - Medical evidence of accused showed that there were signs of recent sexual intercourse - Factum of rape upon victim was proved by her medical evidence - Delay in filing FIR had been explained and no negative impact was notice on accused - Ocular evidence was corroborated with medical evidence - Chain of circumstances was completed to prove guilt of accused - Hence, order of conviction was proper. (Para 10,29,31,34,35)

(A) Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), O.39, R.1 , O.39, R.2, O.43, R.1(r) - Stay of injunction - Legality - Respondents were restrained from carrying out construction over the suit property - Appellate Court failed to assign any reasons while staying the injunction - Prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury was not examined - Impugned stay order reflected non-application of mind - Order held arbitrary and unsustainable in law - Requirement of reasoned order is integral to judicial process - Impugned order set aside and matter remanded. (Para 7, 9, 12)

(A) Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894), S.23 - Compensation - Enhancement - Comparable sale instances are the most reliable method for determining market value - Two sale deeds showed Rs.3.33 lakh per kanal and Rs.6.00 lakh per kanal - Since multiple comparable sale instances existed with marginal variation, averaging was permissible - Reference Court failed to properly appreciate sale deeds in vicinity and oral evidence regarding potential value - Landowners entitled to fair market value based on comparable sales - Compensation enhanced considering mean value at Rs.4.67 lakh per kanal. (Para 22, 23, 24)

(A) Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (45 of 2023), S.126(2), S.70 - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (46 of 2023), S.483 - Bail - Gang rape - Allegation that driver of auto restrained her physically and thereafter accused committed rape - Prosecutrix escaped, hid and later reported the incident and underwent medical examination - Investigation complete and trial commenced - Accused not required for further custodial interrogation - Accused presumed as innocent until proven guilty - Bail granted with stringent conditions - Merits including consent not be examined at bail stage.. (Para 10, 11, 13)

(A) Constitution of India, Art.226 - Benefit of revised pay scale - Claim for - Petitioners, employees accepted Voluntary Retirement Scheme in year 2002 - Scheme was introduced at time when company had stopped payment of salaries for long periods and basic facilities were curtailed - Scheme itself preserves right of employees to receive recalculated benefits once pay revision was implemented - Similarly situated officers were given benefit of revised pay scale - Both officers and employees accepted voluntary retirement under same scheme in same year and their retiral benefits were to be determined on basis of applicable pay structure - Object of implementing 1997 pay revision was to bring parity with revised public sector pay structure with effect from January 1, 1997 - Denial of benefit only to workmen while extending it to officers bears no rational nexus with that object and therefore amounts to arbitrary discrimination - Fund amounting to Rs.417 Crores was made available pursuant to orders of Supreme Court for settlement of liabilities including arrear salary after implementation of revised pay scale - Employer themselves have utilized said fund for payment to another category of employees -Selective denial of same benefit to petitioners was wholly arbitrary - Petitioners, who had accepted voluntary retirement in year 2002, cannot be deprived of benefit of revised pay scale of 1997 with effect from January 1, 1997 - Petitioners were entitled to have their pay and all consequential retiral benefits recalculated on basis of revised pay scale of 1997 with effect from January 1, 1997. (Para 27 to 36, 40,41, 42)

(A) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (46 of 2023), S. 528 - Criminal proceedings - Expeditious disposal of - Although FIR was lodged in 1987 and a charge-sheet was submitted in 1990, matter could not even be committed to Sessions Court, despite that in 2019, there was a specific direction passed by High Court to do needful regard same - Directions were issued to jurisdictional court to conclude proceedings regarding commitment of case to Sessions Court, preferably within a period of six weeks from date of communication of order. (Para 4, 5)

(A) Karnataka Land Revenue Act (12 of 1964), S.197 - Karnataka Land Revenue Rules (1966), R.21 - Administrative action - Notice proposing to treat B-Kharab land for burial ground - Legality - Petitioner's title traced from his grandfather, who was granted occupancy rights under Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act in respect of 4 acres 39 guntas of cultivable land and 10 acres 20 guntas of kharab land - As per R.21, A-Kharab land is unfit for cultivation but forms part of holder's land whereas B-Kharab is reserved for public purpose such as burial ground, roads, tanks, etc. - None of the conditions under R.21(2)(b) existed - No evidence of land being used as burial/cremation ground produced - Neither land was reserved for public purpose nor any tank, road or public utility existed - Occupancy certificate covered only 15 acres 19 guntas - But without prior determination of total extent of land, classification of 3 acres 27 guntas as B-Kharab was arbitrary - Impugned notice was contrary to law hence set aside - Order directing reclassification as A-Kharab land was upheld. (Para 25, 26, 27, 28)

(A) Jharkhand Pension Rules (2000), R.139, R.43(b) - Constitution of India, Art.226, Art.309 - Deduction of pension - Violation of procedural mandate - Respondents were appointed as Assistant Engineer in 1979 and retired as Engineer-in-Chief - Allegation of irregularities by them in desilted soil disposal works during 2014-15 - Reduction of pension under R.139 permissible only in two circumstances ie entire service of employee thoroughly not satisfactory and grave misconduct is proved - Neither entire service record was examined - Nor full-fledged departmental proceedings conducted to prove grave misconduct of respondents - Pension was reduced on basis of alleged irregularities pertaining to a single instance during service - Department was required to follow procedure akin to dismissal proceedings within limitation period which it failed to follow - Action violative of procedural mandate and improper- Order of 5% deduction of pension rightly set aside by Single Judge. (Para 35, 36, 38, 39, 41)

(A) National Highways Act (48 of 1956), S.3H - Waqf Act (43 of 1995), S.91, S.83 - Acquisition of Waqf property for public purpose - Jurisdiction of Waqf Tribunal - Waqf Tribunal stayed construction by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) on several plots (Masjids and Kabristans), holding that the acquisition process violated S. 91 of the Waqf Act - NHAI challenged this injunction, pleading that the N.H. Act is a self-contained code - N.H. Act, 1956, is a special legislation for acquisition of land for national highways - It prevails over the general provisions of Waqf Act regarding the physical acquisition of land for infrastructure - S. 91 of the Waqf Act does not prohibit acquisition; it merely entitles the Waqf Board to notice and a right to report on the compensation - Waqf Tribunal lacks the jurisdiction to injunct or interfere with land acquisition proceedings initiated for public purpose under the N.H. Act - Order of injunction was set aside. (Para 23, 24)

(A) Succession Act (39 of 1925), S.383 - Revocation of probate - Application for - Maintainability - Caveatable Interest - Parties were relatives of deceased testator - Probate was granted to petitioner, tastator's son in law and children - Respondents, brother and other relatives, sought revocation on ground that testator had no title to property - Respondents did not claim through the testator; rather asserted independent title adverse to the testator - Such persons were strangers to probate proceedings as they did not possess caveatable interest - Respondents directly challenged testator's title based on prior Wills - Their claim was independent ownership claim, not succession-based claim - No pleadings as to inheritance through testator were made - Their dispute was purely one of title - Probate Court could not adjudicate title - Remedy lies in a Civil Suit for title - Application for revocation of probate was not maintainable. (Para 26, 29, 30)